163rd Rifle Division

163rd Rifle Division (August 1939 - June 4, 1940) 163rd Motorized Division (June 4, 1940 – September 15, 1941) 163rd Rifle Division (September 15, 1941 – 1945)
Active	1939–1945
Country	Soviet Union
Branch	Red Army
Type	Infantry, Motorized Infantry
Size	Division
Engagements	Winter War Battle of Suomussalmi Battle of Raate Road Leningrad strategic defensive Soltsy-Dno Offensive Demyansk Pocket Demyansk Offensive (1943) Battle of Kursk Battle of the Dnieper Battle of Kiev (1943) Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy Uman–Botoșani offensive First Jassy–Kishinev offensive Second Jassy–Kishinev offensive Battle of Debrecen Budapest offensive Vienna offensive
Decorations	Order of Lenin  Order of the Red Banner  Order of Suvorov  Order of Kutuzov
Battle honours	Romny Kiev
Commanders
Notable commanders	Maj. Gen. Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov Maj. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich Kuznetsov Col. Grigorii Petrovich Kotov Col. Mikhail Semyonovich Nazarov Col. Kuzma Andreevich Vasilev Maj. Gen. Fyodor Vasilevich Karlov

The 163rd Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army just before the Second World War began, in the Tula Oblast, based on the pre-September 13, 1939 shtat (table of organization and equipment). As a reinforced rifle division, it took part in the Winter War with Finland, where it was encircled at Suomussalmi. Despite a rescue attempt by the 44th Rifle Division from the Raate Road (which was also the route used by some of the 163rd's forces) the division was largely destroyed in one of the best-known Finnish victories of the war.

What little remained of the 163rd was moved postwar to Novgorod in the Leningrad Military District to be rebuilt as a motorized division. At the outbreak of war with Germany it was assigned to 1st Mechanized Corps and was part of the reserves of the redesignated Northern Front. In common with most Soviet motorized divisions it was significantly short of trucks and its outdated tanks were lost, mostly to breakdowns, before the end of August. During that month, as part of 34th Army, it took part in the Northwestern Front's counterstrike at Staraya Russa which briefly surrounded two German divisions and inflicted a considerable delay on Army Group North's advance on Leningrad, although at heavy cost.

On September 15 reality was acknowledged and the 163rd was again formed as a regular rifle division. Along with its Army it was forced back toward, and then past, the town of Demyansk, and it would be involved in the fighting around the German-held salient until early 1943.

Formation

The division began forming in August 1939, in the Tula Oblast, based on a rifle regiment of the 84th Rifle Division. Col. Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov was appointed to command that month; he had been serving as commander of tank forces of 3rd Rifle Corps. He was promoted to the rank of Kombrig on November 4 and this would be modernized to major general on June 4, 1940, the day he left the division.

By September the 163rd was already being concentrated on the border with Latvia. In late October - early November it was moved to East Karelia, first as part of the Special Rifle Corps of 8th Army and then into the 47th Rifle Corps of 9th Army, which was under command of Komkor V. I. Chuikov. Over the next weeks it was heavily reinforced, until it comprised:

• 529th Rifle Regiment (from 54th Rifle Division)
• 662nd Rifle Regiment
• 759th Rifle Regiment
• 593rd Rifle Regiment (from 131st Rifle Division)
• 81st Mountain Rifle Regiment (from 54th Rifle Division)
• 365th Reconnaissance Regiment
• 365th Armored Car Battalion

These additional forces raised the personnel strength under Zelentsov to some 13,562 men.

Battle of Suomussalmi

The provincial town of Suomussalmi, with a population of some 4,000 inhabitants, was a target for the Red Army largely due its position on the east side of the narrow "waist" of Finland, sitting astride the shortest route to Oulu, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. The roads on the Finnish side of the border were fairly well-developed in this region. When the 163rd crossed the border on November 30 it was burdened with such extraneous frills as a brass band, printing presses, plus truckloads of propaganda leaflets and of good-will gifts for the local populace. Although the possibilities were greatly exaggerated by Soviet intelligence, it was true that voters in the region tended to vote for left-wing parties and policies in national elections. If the town could be taken, good roads led to the rail junction at Hyrynsalmi, from where Oulu was only 240km distant.

Chuikov had deployed his Army in three columns. 54th Division (less the regiments attached to the 163rd) took the southern route, with the objective of reaching the town of Kuhmo. The center column was made up of the 163rd and the 44th Rifle Division moving on two roads toward Suomussalmi. In the north the 122nd Rifle Division advanced on Salla in an effort to link up with 14th Army's 88th Rifle Division. In common with all the Red Army thrusts into the central and northern wildernesses the Finns were taken aback that the Soviets were even bothering to attack there, and in such massive strength. The 163rd pushed off from its base at Ukhta, on the Murmansk Railroad, along one of the many forest roads that had been secretly built to access the border.

Battle of Suomussalmi. Note positions of the 163rd.

Two roads led to Suomussalmi. The northern Juntusranta Road ran southwest before joining a main north-south route that led through the town and then by separate routes to Hyrynsalmi and to Peranka. The southern Raate Road intersected the Hyrynsalmi–Peranka route in the middle of Suomussalmi. Of the two, the Raate Road was the most improved, and the Finns were expecting it to be used if a Soviet attack came. Zelentsov, however, sent two of his regiments along the Juntusranta Road, gaining complete tactical surprise and overwhelming a 50-man company of border guards. The two regiments pressed on and reached the Palovaara junction overnight on December 5/6. Meanwhile, another regiment was moving into Suomussalmi itself via the Raate Road after overcoming the resistance of two platoons of border guards and a pair of improvised roadblocks by the end of December 1. Thereafter, it faced several reserve companies from Kajaani which slowed, but did not stop its progress. By the morning of December 7 all civilians had been evacuated from the town, and most of its buildings were set afire, but it was a hasty job and some were missed while others were saved by Zelentsov's men after they entered. Altogether there were enough to shelter several hundred men. Of the two regiments on the Juntusranta Road, one turned north toward Peranka and the other reached Suomussalmi later that day to link up with the regiment from the Raate Road.

The Finnish command was responding to the situation by committing companies and battalions of reinforcements as they mobilized. The thrust on the Juntusranta Road appeared to be the more significant threat, and the independent infantry battalion ErP-16 began arriving at Peranka at 0100 hours on December 6. By noon the whole battalion had taken up good defensive ground near Lake Piispajarvi, in time to meet the probing attacks of the lead elements of the 662nd Rifle Regiment, which had orders to reach Peranka by nightfall. This led to 24 hours of skirmishing, during which the initiative gradually passed to the Finns, despite being outnumbered about two-to-one. By now, all the Finnish forces operating north of the Palovaara road junction were grouped into "Task Force Susi" under command of Lt. Col. Paavo Susitaival, and the force was able to contain the 662nd, led by Colonel Sharov, with relative ease. In part this was due to one of Zelentsov's first of many costly mistakes; he had retained one of Sharov's battalions as his divisional reserve. Sharov made his situation worse on December 11 by sending a radio message to the rear, soon deciphered by Finnish intelligence, in which he complained that his men lacked boots, snowsuits, and adequate food. Further communications revealed that one of the divisional political officers had been "fragged" by some of his men, and a transmission on December 13 reported 160 battle casualties and 48 frostbite cases in the regiment to date, some 10 percent of its active strength, all while skirmishing.

Sharov tried to regain the initiative on December 14-15 and managed to make a temporary advance from Haapavaara to Ketola, but this was halted by mortar and Maxim machine gun fire. The lead battalion suffered 150 casualties, which brought his cumulative casualties to roughly 20 percent. With his soldiers reaching the end of their physical strength, Sharov ordered them over to the defensive. Meanwhile, Zelentsov had concentrated two regiments and most of his heavy weapons in Suomussalmi and the immediate area, and the Finns expected a new drive to commence on Hyrynsalmi. Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim had already ordered the sole uncommitted regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, JR-27, under command of Col. Hjalmar Siilasvuo, to the area to deal with the threat. Under the operational plan, JR-27 was to form the core of an ad hoc task force of approximately brigade strength which was to destroy the 163rd. This was an ambitious objective as Zelentsov had attached tanks and organic artillery, as well as being numerically stronger in manpower. JR-27, on the other hand, had no heavy weapons at all, and lacked a full inventory of such basics as tents and snowsuits.

However, Siilasvuo's force had plenty of skis and men with experience in their use. Most were from small northern towns, many had worked as loggers, and they knew the forests well. Already there were over 30cm of snow on the ground. What the Finns lacked in firepower they could counter with mobility. Siilasvuo established his headquarters at Hyrynsalmi and concentrated his troops there, some 40km south of Suomussalmi. When elements of the 163rd advanced on that place on December 9 they were surprised to come under heavy machine gun fire just 1-2km from their jumping-off line.

Finnish Counterattack

By the end of December 10 Siilasvuo was beginning to formulate his counterattack plan. He had all three battalions of his JR-27 plus two composite battalions of covering troops who had been in action since November 30. In an effort to reassure these tired men he put a rumor about that his regiment was just the leading element of an entire division, and to back this up Mannerheim designated his command as the 9th Division on December 22. After examining the situation, Siilasvuo became convinced he could deal with Zelentsov, who had shown a lack of aggression and whose 662nd Regiment was almost entirely passive. The balance of the 163rd was by now strung out in a road column nearly 40km long from Piispajärvi back to east of Suomussalmi. In order to make sure he had the division "in the bag" Siilasvuo first moved to cut the Raate Road behind it to prevent any reinforcements from intervening. Overnight on December 10/11 he moved the bulk of JR-27 to an assembly area southeast of the town, some 8km south of the Raate Road. Meanwhile, his engineers built a network of ice roads to enhance the mobility of the few artillery pieces.

On the morning of December 12 Siilasvuo launched the first of many road-cutting operations that would be carried out over the coming weeks. By concentrating superior firepower on a selected sector of the road Red Army soldiers were overwhelmed despite desperate resistance, after which reinforcements would widen the gap as combat engineers began to fortify each end of the gap, some 400m wide. Siilasvuo had chosen a natural choke point close to the eastern tail of the 163rd's column, which was a 1,500m-wide isthmus between Lake Kuivasjärvi and Lake Kuomasjärvi. Any Soviet forces that arrived to rescue the 163rd would have to attack across the frozen lakes in the face of machine gun fire to outflank the roadblock; just 350 men were left to hold it against the eventual relief attempt by 44th Rifle Division.

The Finnish commander now launched an attack by a battalion against Soviet positions west of the village of Hulkoniemi. This had only limited success as the defenders were well entrenched and had artillery support, but Finnish harassing fire effectively isolated Suomussalmi from this direction. Siilasvuo now moved to tighten the noose around the 163rd with a series of sharp raids along the road north of Hulkoniemi and into the western outskirts of the town itself. In one skirmish a pair of T-28 tanks attacked a Finnish squad caught in a lightly wooded area. They were engaged by two junior officers, one armed with a grenade bundle and another with an automatic pistol to provide "covering fire". After he emptied three magazines against the armor the tank crews lost their nerve and retreated back to Suomussalmi before the grenades could be deployed.

Siilasvuo received his first artillery support on December 16 when four 76.2mm pieces of 1890s vintage arrived. These were followed on the 18th by a more modern battery of the same calibre, and then on December 22 by a pair of badly-needed 37mm Bofors antitank guns. Within days he also received infantry regiment JR-64, a battalion of "ski guerillas" designated P-1, and an independent infantry battalion. His total strength now stood at some 11,500 men. Meanwhile, Task Force Susi, still containing the 662nd Regiment, was reinforced by bicycle battalion PPP-6 which was tasked with clearing a track a few kilometres northwest of Suomussalmi of a group of Soviet cavalry, probably of the 365th Reconnaissance Regiment. This was accomplished in a series of firefights during December 17-22. At the same time the Task Force itself sent about 2/3rds of its men, on skis, on a wide flanking march to Tervavaara. From there they made raids against the 163rds positions near the Palovaara road junction. On December 23 the newly-formed regiment JR-65 arrived from Oulu to further reinforce the Task Force. Taking up positions on the north shore of Lake Piispajärvi it began rolling the 662nd back as far as Haapavaari by Christmas. This effectively pinned Sharov's men in place so they could do nothing the assist the main force near Suomussalmi. In fact the Regiment's resistance was rapidly fading as the Task Force found when it retook the Palovaara junction on December 27.

The Rescue Attempt

Already on December 13 Siilasvuo's single reconnaissance aircraft had reported that a fresh Soviet division was moving slowly westward along the Raate Road; again due to poor radio security this was soon identified as the 44th, under command of Kombrig A. I. Vinogradov. Finnish intelligence stated that Vinogradov intended to drive through and link up with the 163rd as early as December 22. It was rated as a better unit than the 163rd, with a much longer history and greater tank support. It included the battalion of the 662nd Regiment that had been held in reserve. All that was initially available to stop it was the 350 men at the roadblock. In order to prevent pressure against this position Siilasvuo ordered a series of sharp attacks against the head of the 44th, while also pushing forward the destruction of the 163rd. These attacks did little real damage, but led Vinogradov to believe he was being ambushed by superior forces. A following combination of sniper attacks, five-minute mortar bombardments, and ski raids by night caused his men to lose sleep and hot meals, and he soon entirely lost his nerve. His advance guard got close enough to actually hear the fighting around the 163rd, but the main force of the 44th failed to advance another metre.

The Encirclement Battle

During December 23-25 Zelentsov directed his men in several attempts to break out. The Finns lost ground in several places due to Soviet firepower and armor, but always retook their original positions within 24 hours, usually at night, which was almost continual at this latitude at this time of the year. In the process the 163rd used up much of its remaining ammunition. By December 26 Siilasvuo was convinced there would be no breakout. His all-out attack began the next day, directed primarily at the western side of the Suomussalmi perimeter. Two battalions struck Hulkoniemi, and another two against the main road about 1,500m to the north. These were supported by all eight Finnish 76.2mm guns, and each force had one anti-tank gun. Twelve km farther north the PPP-6 battalion made a two-pronged attack on the Kylänmaki road junction. There were several diversionary attacks as well. All of them stepped off more or less on time at 0800 hours. The push at Hulkoniemi faced strong resistance, and Detachment Paavola got mixed up on open ice against several small Soviet groups with tank support. However, PPP-6 successfully rolled up most of the defenses it faced and destroyed six vehicles. The results on December 28 improved, with PPP-6 taking the Kylänmaki junction and holding it against a vigorous counterattack. The attack at Hulkoniemi initially fared about the same until at about 0900 resistance suddenly collapsed. Some defenders crossed the narrows to enter Suomussalmi while others abandoned their weapons and fled across the ice of Lake Kiantajärvi in the general direction of the Soviet frontier. Dressed in khaki overcoats they were conspicuous against the snow and were easily targeted by Finnish machine guns from both sides.

The resistance in the town itself was tough, with many machine gun posts established in fortified cellars. These had to be taken one after the next with grenades and sub-machine guns, but the position was utterly untenable, and soon the survivors were also streaming across the ice, as vulnerable as those who had come before, or more so as Siilasvuo and his staff had anticipated the directions they would follow and had strung barbed wire entanglements while also bringing the artillery to bear. By December 28 resistance in and around Suomussalmi had ended, with only one regimental-sized pocket holding out on the road north of Hulkoniemi. The defenders made dozens of desperate attempts to breakout at late as 1000 hours on December 29. The last effort left some 300 Red Army men dead with negligible casualties to the Finns. Given the dense terrain it was inevitable that some fairly large bodies of troops would be able to escape undetected. Siilasvuo again anticipated some of these efforts and attempted to intercept with motorized machine gun crews and even a rare air strike by a pair of Bristol Blenheim bombers. When the firing ended on December 30 the 163rd had ceased to exist as an organized division. All its artillery, other heavy weapons, and attached tanks had been lost. In the immediate vicinity of Suomussalmi the Finns counted more than 5,000 dead, and it was impossible to calculate how many more had perished in the forests leading back to the border. In spite of everything, the Finns only took 500 prisoners from the division, in addition to capturing 11 tanks.

Despite the overall disaster, four men of the attached 81st Mountain Rifle Regiment were made Heroes of the Soviet Union on January 26, 1940. Among them was Lt. Pyotr Tikhonovich Mikhailitsyn, commander of the reconnaissance company. On November 30 he had led his men, who were experienced skiers, 20km behind Finnish lines to capture the village of Yuntusranta and hold there until the remainder of the regiment came up. On December 9 the company became surrounded while on a scouting mission. Despite being wounded he organized a successful breakout. Mikhailitsyn would go on to serve as deputy commander of the 112th Rifle Division at the Battle of Stalingrad. After furthering his military education he was given command of the 5th Rifle Division and was promoted to major general on September 13, 1944. He would reach the rank of lieutenant general before his retirement in 1956, and lived in Volgograd until his death on February 11, 1961.

Zelentsov and his staff were among those who escaped, so the division was not disbanded, evading the fate of the 18th Rifle Division to the south. He would leave the 163rd to take command of the 88th Rifle Division. He was more fortunate than Vinogradov, who was executed in front of his remaining men, along with his chief of staff, on January 11. Colonel Sharov of the 662nd Regiment would share this fate. Zelentsov became the acting commander of the Arkhangelsk Military District shortly after the German invasion in 1941, but was killed in action on August 15. Ivan Mikhailovich Kuznetsov took over command of the division on June 4 and had his rank modernized to major general on the same day. He had previously served as deputy commander of the 84th Rifle Division and more recently as commander of the 62nd Rifle Division.

163rd Motorized Division

What remained of the core 163rd, amounting to some 753 personnel, was withdrawn after the war to Novgorod. As the remnants of the division required a substantial rebuild it was selected to be converted into a motorized division. Already by mid-April its strength had been brought up to some 6,000. Orders to this effect became effective on July 1, and it was assigned to be the motorized division of 1st Mechanized Corps. General Kuznetsov continued in command, where he would remain for the duration of the division's existence as a motorized unit. Its order of battle, as of the beginning of the German invasion, was as follows:

• 529th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 759th Motorized Rifle Regiment
• 25th Tank Regiment (until August 25, 1941)
• 365th Artillery Regiment
• 204th Antitank Battalion
• 320th Antiaircraft Battalion
• 177th Reconnaissance Battalion
• 230th Light Engineer Battalion
• 248th Signal Battalion
• 172nd Artillery Park Battalion
• 298th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
• 148th Auto Transport Battalion
• 122nd Repair and Recovery Battalion
• 20th Regulation Company
• 334th Motorized Field Bakery (later 274th)
• 91st Divisional Artillery Workshop
• 457th Field Postal Station
• 198th Field Office of the State Bank

At this time it was still in 1st Mechanized Corps, along with the 3rd Tank Division and 5th Motorcycle Regiment, in the Leningrad Military District, which was soon redesignated as Northern Front. The division itself was stationed at Ostrov, in summer camps at Cherekha. 25th Tank Regiment had four battalions, for an official compliment of 252 tanks and 12 armored cars, and it was very close to this figure, but these were all older models (25 BT-5s, 229 T-26s, 13 T-37/38s) but some 23 of these were non-operational. Kuznetsov had his forces on the march by 2000 hours, en route for the Gatchina area. The District commander, Lt. Gen. M. M. Popov, had prepared a defense plan on May 25 which proposed the formation of five "covering regions", each manned by the forces of its own Army. Under this plan, as originally formulated, the 163rd and 3rd Tank, plus the 191st, 177th, and 70th Rifle Divisions were retained as Popov's reserve, although some of these additional forces had been reassigned by the outbreak of the war.

By the beginning of July the Corps had left the reserve and had been moved to 11th Army in Northwestern Front. After its breakneck advance through the Baltic states, Army Group North began moving again early on July 9 from the Pskov and Ostrov regions. It was now 250km from Leningrad.

Counterstroke at Staraya Russa

By mid-July the Army Group's drive had stalled, due to logistics, difficult terrain and Red Army resistance, including a counterattack near Soltsy which temporarily encircled the 8th Panzer Division. On July 30 Hitler issued a directive for the renewal of the offensive with a main attack between Narva and Lake Ilmen. This was followed on August 6 with a communique from OKW that stated Soviet forces had been almost completely cleared from the Baltic states and that the start line had been occupied for the thrust on Leningrad. Meanwhile, the STAVKA was preparing for the renewed offensive and issued orders on August 9 and 10 to Marshal K. E. Voroshilov of the Northwestern Direction and Maj. Gen. P. P. Sobennikov of Northwestern Front to use the reinforcements provided to them in late July and early August for a counterstroke aimed at destroying German forces in the Soltsy, Staraya Russa and Dno regions. The operation would be largely planned and directed by Lt. Gen. N. F. Vatutin, Sobennikov's chief of staff. By this time the 163rd had lost nearly all its tanks to direct and indirect fire and air attack, but primarily to mechanical breakdown, and the 25th Regiment would be officially disbanded on August 25, but it was already a mechanized division in name only, as it had never had a full compliment of trucks.

Vatutin's plan involved concentric attacks by the 11th, 27th, 34th and 48th Armies and was clearly overly ambitious. It was to begin on August 12 aimed at 16th Army's X Army Corps which was defending at Staraya Russa and, after cutting it off and destroying it, to then liberate Soltsy, Dno and Kholm, disrupting the German offensive. In the event it was preempted when the German forces went over to their own attacks on August 10, but still achieved success on some sectors. Most notably the 202nd and 163rd Motorized, which were now in 34th Army, joined the 25th Cavalry Division in a lunge that pushed 40km westward through the German defensive cordon and reached the Staraya Russa–Dno rail line early on August 14. This determined assault enveloped X Corps in Staraya Russa, separated it from II Army Corps on its right flank and threatened the rear of the main German panzer force advancing on Novgorod. The situation was restored by August 22 through the intervention of the LVI Motorized Corps and three days later the 34th and 11th Armies had been driven back to the line of the Lovat River. Although suffering heavy losses (from August 10–28 34th Army suffered 60 percent casualties in personnel, 89 percent losses in tanks and 58 percent in other vehicles) the Soltsy-Dno operation delayed Army Group North's drive on Leningrad for another 10 days which may have been decisive in keeping the city in Soviet hands. On September 15 reality was acknowledged and the 163rd was reorganized as a regular rifle division.

Reformation

Once reformed, the division's order of battle became as follows:

• 529th Rifle Regiment (from 529th Motorized Rifle Regiment)
• 759th Rifle Regiment (from 759th Motorized Rifle Regiment)
• 1318th Rifle Regiment (formed from reservists)
• 365th Artillery Regiment
• 204th Antitank Battalion
• 462nd Mortar Battalion (from November 4, 1941 to October 23, 1942)
• 177th Reconnaissance Company
• 203rd Sapper Battalion (until July 15, 1943), 230th Sapper Battalion (after July 15, 1943)
• 248th Signal Battalion (later 248th Signal Company)
• 298th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
• 97th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
• 267th Auto Transport Company
• 334th Field Bakery
• 250th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
• 837th Field Postal Station
• 509th Field Office of the State Bank

General Kuznetsov remained in command only until September 18. He would later briefly lead the 254th and 360th Rifle Divisions, and then for a longer term in 332nd Rifle Division, before he moved into the physical and combat training establishment. He was replaced for ten days by Col. Pyotr Efimovich Popov, and then by Col. Grigorii Petrovich Kotov, who had been chief of staff of 8th Army during the Winter War.

Battles for Demyansk

Following the Staraya Russa fighting the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal W. J. F. von Leeb, resolved to ensure that his right flank was secure before beginning the final push on Leningrad. Constant Soviet attacks from the Valdai Hills region enticed 16th Army to keep pushing farther eastward. Given the losses the 34th Army had suffered and the priority for Soviet reinforcements on the Moscow and Leningrad axes there was little it could do to stop this advance, although the 11th and 27th Armies held firm on the flanks. Demyansk was taken in early September, but by now LVI Motorized Corps was in an absurd position at the end of a single 90km-long dirt road through swamps back to the railhead at Staraya Russa. LVI Motorized was soon withdrawn in preparation for the renewed offensive on Moscow, and was replaced by II Corps. As winter began to arrive in October the 16th Army's offensive came to a halt and a period of stalemate settled over the area.

34th Army was under command of Maj. Gen. N. E. Berzarin. As the Red Army's winter counteroffensive widened from the Moscow area he was ordered to form two division-sized shock groups to support the efforts of 11th and 3rd Shock Armies but otherwise to fix as much of German 16th Army in place as possible with diversionary attacks. The 163rd was located directly northeast of Demyansk itself, facing most of 3rd SS Division Totenkopf. After months of sporadic activity the division, along with the rest of Berzarin's army, finally ran down in the third week of March, 1942. Colonel Kotov had left the division on February 16, and was replaced by Col. Mikhail Semyonovich Nazarov. Kotov would later command the 47th Army and the 6th Guards Rifle Corps, rising to the rank of lieutenant general, but was killed in action while leading the latter in November 1944. Nazarov had commanded the 182nd Rifle Division in 1941 before being removed from his post.

References

Bibliography

• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967a). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть I. 1920 - 1944 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part I. 1920–1944] (in Russian). Moscow.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. pp. 80, 204
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 183, 337

External links

• Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov
• Ivan Mikhailovich Kuznetsov
• Grigorii Petrovich Kotov
• Mikhail Semyonovich Nazarov
• Fyodor Vasilevich Karlov