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CHINA
- February 2022).[1] The Committee has taken evidence from a wide range of witnesses and considered a substantial volume of written evidence. We are grateful to those witnesses from outside the Intelligence Community—in particular John Gerson, Raffaello Pantucci, Charles Parton, Lord Patten, Dr Tim Stevens and Professor Steve Tsang—for kindly volunteering their very substantial expertise on China, as part of the Inquiry; we have benefitted greatly from their experience and knowledge.
- This Report has been split into two parts. Part One considers the overall intelligence threat from China to the UK, and HMG's response to that threat. Part Two considers Case Studies on the threat to three specific areas—Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy—together with an annex considering China's response to, and use of, the Covid-19 pandemic.[2]
The 'whole-of-state' threat
- It is clear that China has taken advantage of the policy of successive British Governments to boost economic ties between the UK and China, which has enabled it to advance its commercial, science and technology, and industrial goals in order to gain a strategic advantage. The fact that China is a strategic threat is not news. However, this Report explores the multifaceted nature of the intelligence threat posed by China.
- China almost certainly maintains the largest state intelligence apparatus in the world—dwarfing the UK's Intelligence Community and presenting a challenge for our Agencies to cover. As a result, our Agencies' work has to be targeted on those aspects that are most damaging. However, the problem is compounded by China's 'whole-of-state' approach. In practice, this means that Chinese state-owned and non-state-owned companies, as well as academic and cultural establishments and ordinary Chinese citizens, are liable to be (willingly or unwillingly) co-opted into espionage and interference operations overseas: much of the impact that China has on national security is overt—through its economic might, its takeovers and mergers, its interaction with Academia and Industry—as opposed to covert activity carried out by its intelligence officers.
- China's size, ambition and capability have enabled it to successfully penetrate every sector of the UK’s economy, and—until the Covid-19 pandemic—Chinese money was readily accepted by HMG with few questions asked. China's commercial and industrial strategy is deliberately calibrated to establish China as an economic leader, a digital technology powerhouse and a global commercial power—on which the West is dependent. China has been buying up and seeking to control or influence the UK's Industry and Energy sectors: we have already mentioned China's interest in the UK's Civil Nuclear sector. China has been encouraged by decisions to allow the China General Nuclear Power Group into Hinkley Point C and promises of future investment in other sites. The Government has been
- ↑ The Committee began this Inquiry in 2019. Shortly afterwards followed: the dissolution of the Intelligence and Security Committee in November 2019 ahead of the General Election; a series of national lockdowns in 2020 and 2021 in the wake of the global Covid-19 pandemic; and the excessive delay in appointing a new Committee from December 2019 to July 2020. These events have impeded the conclusion of this Inquiry and the publication of our Report. Throughout this period, we continued to question, and take evidence from, the Intelligence Community on this important and timely Inquiry. (In preparing this Report, the Committee has considered evidence up to 2021.)
- ↑ The two Parts of the Report are designed to be read in conjunction.
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